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“As White as Most White Women”:
Racial Passing in Advertisements
for Runaway Slaves and the Origins
of a Multivalent Term
Martha J. Cutter
In 1731 a man named Gideon Gibson, along with several of his relatives, 
emigrated from Virginia to South Carolina. At first it was reported with con-
sternation that Gibson was a free black man married to a white wife.1 How-
ever, when the South Carolina House of Assembly took up an investigation 
of Gibson, then governor Robert Johnson concluded that the Gibson family 
were “not Negroes nor Slave but Free people.”2 The Gibsons were allowed to 
remain in the colony, and they prospered, eventually purchasing 450 acres of 
prime South Carolina land; Gibson owned black slaves, and his sister married 
a wealthy planter. Gideon Gibson’s son married a white woman and himself 
became the owner of at least seven slaves. It would be forty-five more years be-
fore the colonies declared independence from Britain, but it seems the Gibsons 
had already declared themselves free from the social, legal, or ideological codes 
that would construct them as black, Negro, or mulatto. Another investigation in 
1768 revealed that Gideon Gibson, Jr., “escaped the penalties of the negro law 
by producing upon comparison more red and white in his face than could be 
discovered in the faces of half the descendants of … [the House of Assembly].”3 
Gideon Gibson, Jr., was judged to have been passing for white; he was in ac-
tuality a very light-skinned black man with black ancestors.4 Yet he was also a 
slave owner and a prosperous member of South Carolinian society.
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On May 15, 1845, an enslaved black woman named Fanny ran away from 
her Alabama owner. Since Fanny could read and write, her owner speculates 
in an advertisement posted in the Alabama Beacon (June 14, 1845) that she 
might forge a pass for herself. But Fanny’s master also comments that “she is 
as white as most white women, with straight light hair, and blue eyes, and can 
pass herself for a white woman.”5 Fanny can pass for white, but indeed one 
wonders what her owner means when he says that she is “as white as most 
white women.” Are many “white women” not quite “pure” white? And yet they 
are not subject to perpetual enslavement, as Fanny is. Fanny is also described 
as “very pious” and “very intelligent.” This valuable piece of “property,” it is 
implied, in other ways is no different from a white woman. She is religious, 
rational, and light-skinned. In what ways is she not, the advertisement seems to 
wonder, a “white woman”? The advertisement appears to grant Fanny humanity 
as more than property, even as it seeks to re-enslave her. Her owner seems to 
know that nothing but “a fiction of law and custom”—to borrow Mark Twain’s 
words in Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894)—keeps her enslaved.6
Although some scholars argue that racial passing began in earnest in the 
mid- to late nineteenth century, reached its pinnacle in the early twentieth cen-
tury, and then abated or became “passé” by the 1930s,7 these two incidents and 
many others discussed in this essay indicate that, as both a word and a behavior, 
passing has a longer and more extensive early history and genealogy. Moreover, 
its meaning is unstable and changes based on historical context. When Gideon 
Gibson passed for white in 1731, he did so to migrate into a category of identity 
that empowered him in a period in which such racial migration was somewhat 
acceptable because ideologies of black racial inferiority had not yet solidified. 
That he owned slaves himself indicates that he did not see his passing as a chal-
lenge to the codes of law that allowed the perpetual possession of black human 
property; for Gibson slaveholding might have been a sign of his wealth, status, 
and power, rather than a racially inflected behavior. Fanny’s owner, on the other 
hand, manifests a more convoluted attitude toward passing and race, because 
by 1845 the ideology of African American physical and mental inferiority was 
entrenched and often used to rationalize the fact that blacks were the only group 
of individuals who could legally be held in perpetual enslavement in the United 
States. Matthew Frye Jacobson argues that in the United States, “whiteness” 
denoted “not only color but degree of freedom (as against ‘coolies’), level of 
civilization (as against ‘cannibals’), and devotion to Christianity (as against 
‘heathens’ and ‘pagans’).”8 Yet Fanny is Christian, refined, and can pass for a 
white woman so well that no one can tell the difference; so what, exactly, is the 
difference between her and a “real” white woman? Advertisements for runaway 
slaves are clearly part of hegemonic ideology and discourse (systems of lan-
guage and belief that attempt to conform to the dominant society), yet these ad-
vertisements sometimes function in a counter-hegemonic way. As legal scholar 
Ian Haney López has noted, race is “neither an essence nor an illusion, but 
rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro 
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forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions.”9 
These documents illustrate how this process of racial construction functions, 
but they also at times query the social, legal, and ideological classifications that 
demarcate race—that attempt to separate blackness from whiteness as a suppos-
edly inferior, unchanging, hierarchical category of racial identity.
This article brings a strong interpretive lens to the early history of racial 
passing by examining advertisements published in newspapers from 1747 to 
1860 for runaway enslaved blacks who passed racially.10 To assess this topic, I 
created an archive of more than a hundred advertisements for runaway slaves 
that use the actual term “to pass” or “pass for” in a racialized sense.11 I have 
located advertisements stating that enslaved individuals would pass for white 
men or women, would use their light skin to pass for free, would pass for Indian 
or another nationality (such as French), and would pass for married white peo-
ple or families (necessitated by the fact that legal marriage was a privilege re-
served in this time period for free people, not slaves, and black enslaved kinship 
was frequently denied). My goal was to illuminate some of the connotations of 
the term over a broad period to assess any historical or geographical patterns 
that might emerge; however, I did not want to overlook the racial multivalences 
of passing—the way, as historian David Waldstreicher puts it, many of these 
advertisements “create difficulties for any attempt to isolate and describe a uni-
tary and coherent black (or white, or Native American) historical experience.”12
I did not find any unambiguous historical patterns, other than the fact that 
after the American Revolution (when ideologies of black racial inferiority so-
lidified and the indentureship of whites gradually ceased), passing for white and 
for free are more frequently conjoined. In addition, in the thirty years leading up 
to the start of the Civil War, the attempt to fix black racial difference becomes 
more insistent, but even here the data are not absolute. I have therefore orga-
nized this essay topically, rather than historically or geographically, since the 
archive tells us less about a specific history of racism in the colonies and the 
United States and more about the way racial ideologies are made and remade. 
As historian Barbara Jean Fields points out, race is an ideology—a “descriptive 
vocabulary of day-to-day existence, through which people make rough sense 
of the social reality that they live and create from day to day” and the ideology 
of race needs to be “constantly created and verified in social life.”13 These ad-
vertisements speak to the ways ideologies of race are relentlessly constructed, 
deconstructed, and reconstructed over time.
Scholarship on advertisements for runaway slaves has examined this data 
in terms of the information contained about literacy, legal codes, print history, 
enslaved agency, and perception of racial or ethnic identity.14 Yet to date no 
study has examined the actual usage of the term “pass” in these advertisements, 
especially as regards racial passing itself—its meaning and its potential to un-
dermine fixed ideologies of racial difference. Werner Sollors defines passing 
as “the crossing of any line that divides social groups.”15 To this useful clas-
sification I would add that passing is the crossing of any line that divides social 
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groups that are conceptualized as distinct from each other and as wielding dif-
ferential social power. Sollors also argues that the term originates in advertise-
ments for runaway slaves, but he dates these advertisements to the 1780s and 
connects the term (first) with passing for free, not white. However, as I show, 
advertisements for runaway black slaves utilize the term routinely in a variety 
of racialized contexts from 1747 onwards, and it is initially connected with 
passing for white, rather than for free.
In the documents examined the term does not connote a single behavior or 
even a single attitude toward racial ideology. Some general propensities can be 
seen, however. The archive suggests that while laws from state to state and in 
different time periods varied, the idea of an enslaved individual from a black 
family heritage deliberately passing for white was frequently configured as du-
plicitous and even incendiary. In the first half of the nineteenth century, racial 
ideology in the United States became constellated around several key ideas: 
that whites were an inherently superior, civilized, intelligent, and free race, 
while blacks were an inherently inferior, savage, unintelligent, and unfree one; 
that one was black if one had a single black ancestor; and, most importantly, 
that racial characteristics were fixed and racial status unchanging.16 Passing 
successfully for white might constitute a challenge to this ideology. Although 
written by slave masters—many of whom adhered to this construct of race to 
some degree—the advertisements themselves point to the instability of racial 
codes defining whiteness and blackness.17 “How can a human being be both 
a person and a thing?” asks historian Agnes Smedley. She answers that racial 
ideology evolved as one way of dealing with this paradox, as Africans and their 
descendants were eventually defined as “less than fully human, or a different 
and inferior form of human being from whites.”18 This opposition between be-
ing both a person and a thing is fully on display in these advertisements.
Ultimately, these advertisements contain a double-edged content, as they 
simultaneously support and transgress the racial ideology they are designed to 
protect. First, while print culture from this period attempted to control these 
bodies by making them visible and readable as “black” escaped slaves, there is 
evident resistance to this visuality within the enslaved themselves, who clearly 
do not believe in the ideology of racial inferiority or perpetual enslavement. 
Many advertisements for passers depict individuals who are intelligent, civi-
lized, and “white” or “almost white”; they also portray men and women who 
can move from one racial category to another easily and fluidly, through use of 
clothing, hair, speech, or other racialized markers. Second, then, these transfor-
mative, intelligent, near-white individuals at times put the master’s ideology of 
fixed racial difference and the “thingness” of the enslaved into some degree of 
turmoil. This archive of documents therefore at times tells a story in which the 
passing individual makes his or her body a site for category crisis, resistance 
to hegemonic and binary norms of blackness and whiteness, and (occasionally) 
subversion of the systems of meaning that govern racial ideology itself.19 These 
early documents therefore foreshadow many contemporary perplexities about 
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the implication of racial passing and the definition of racial identity—questions 
that have not vanished in our own era.
Historical Overview: From Racial
Migration to Racial Fixity
Fields argues that the laws that marked African or African-descended 
slaves as subject to the condition of perpetual slavery did not come into be-
ing until 1661 and that Euro-Americans “resolved the contradictions between 
slavery and liberty by defining Afro-Americans as a race” sometime between 
the time of the American Revolution (1776) and the ratification of the Consti-
tution (1788).20 Ira Berlin is more sensitive to the ways the idea of perpetual 
enslavement was negotiated in different parts of the United States because of 
disparate labor systems but still sees a new order based in permanent African 
slavery developing in the last decades of the seventeenth century.21 David Brion 
Davis has also examined the profound ways that, during the era of the American 
Revolution, individuals who opposed slavery were complicit with those who 
favored it and settled on race as an explanation for the existence of slavery; 
in so doing both groups coalesced racist ideologies of blackness.22 Certainly, 
slavery in North America was not the result of a single set of laws but rather of 
numerous acts, decisions, and habits that became codified over time into legal 
frameworks regionally in colonial societies and states.23 Ultimately, though, in 
the late eighteenth century these codifications produced a system of bondage 
that rested on perpetual enslavement being reserved solely for black Africans 
and their descendants.
Prior to the American Revolution, white orphans, convicts, and “free-will-
ers” (individuals who booked passage to the colonies in exchange for some 
period of indentured servitude) were brought into the colonies and kept in harsh 
servitude for periods from four to fourteen years (and sometimes for their en-
tire life), and many died from harsh treatment, starvation, or disease. Adver-
tisements for runaway white indentured servants are therefore also frequent in 
early periods of the databases I have searched. A few decades after the Colonies 
established their independence from Britain, however, these practices mostly 
appear to have ended. In 1791 the importation of white convicts as servants 
was banned by law across the United States, and in 1820 the white indentured 
servant trade lost its profitability because of changes in ship design that made 
the journey to the United States cheaper and therefore within the reach of the 
poor.24 This did not mean, of course, that white indentured servitude disap-
peared, but it had certainly died down by the early nineteenth century. Blacks 
were thus left as the only exploitable and profitable racial group permanently 
enslaved as laborers in the United States.
Moreover, after the importation of slaves from Africa was banned in 1807, 
a class within the enslaved population rapidly emerged who looked white but 
were in fact legally black, being born of very light-skinned slave mothers, often 
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fathered by slave owners, an event curated in numerous fictional and nonfic-
tional texts. In the decades preceding the Civil War, racist rationales for keeping 
a “black” slave (no matter how white-looking) in perpetual bondage therefore 
were fortified not only legally but also ideologically. The notion of perpetual 
enslavement of black Americans was subtended by ideologies of physical infe-
riority and (eventually) the argument that “one drop” of “black blood” made an 
individual black. Before the American Revolution, a certain amount of racial 
migration seems to have occurred and been tolerated, at least by individuals 
who were not enslaved, as legal historian Daniel Sharfstein has argued. Sharfs-
tein does, however, see a transition of the “one-drop rule” from an “ideological 
current” to a “legal bright line and presumed social reality” in the thirty years 
preceding the Civil War.25
The solidification of the one-drop rule undoubtedly is difficult to pinpoint; 
some scholars have attempted to trace the rule’s origin to the emergence of the 
cotton economy in the 1830s, to sectional crisis in the 1850s, to Reconstruction, 
or to the 1910s and 1920s, when most Southern state legislatures formally ad-
opted one-drop racial classifications. The one-drop rule is also difficult to define 
because it has been assessed in a variety of ways. It was and is often described 
in terms of the concept that a single black ancestor makes a person black.26 
Because genealogical records at times were scarce or ambiguous, however, ap-
pearance was often relied upon and came to be a proxy for genealogy; if the per-
son looked entirely white, and had been treated and viewed as white, he or she 
was, in court cases such as Guy v. Daniel (1855) and Morrison v. White (1858), 
viewed to be white.27 Nonetheless, as the possibility of freedom approached for 
black Americans as a group, there was an anxious attempt to demarcate and 
stabilize blackness, and a variety of state court cases and statutes attempted to 
legislate white purity through the language of the one-drop rule.28
An early articulation of the one-drop rule in American law occurred in the 
1843 Ohio State Supreme Court case of Lane v. Baker. The attorney for the 
defendant (William Ellsberry) attempted to argue that the “term white, as ap-
plied to persons, has … been … applied as expressive of the pure white race,” 
but Judge C. J. Lane ultimately allowed a boy who was “of negro, Indian and 
white blood” to attend school with whites, without stipulating whether said 
individual was white, black, or Native American.29 The rise of the one-drop rule 
is more strongly evident in Virginia in 1853 when the state legislature debated a 
proposal to “declare all persons to be negroes who may be known or proven to 
have negro blood in them.”30 In 1857 the Louisiana Senate similarly entertained 
a bill for the “prevention of marriages where one of the parties has a taint of 
African blood.”31 Also in 1857 the Arkansas Supreme Court construed the term 
“mulatto” to mean “persons belonging to the negro race, who are of an inter-
mixture of white and negro blood, without regard to grades.”32 In Indiana in 
1863 a measure made it to a floor vote in the state senate, failing by a two vote 
margin, which would have defined black racial status as “possessing any negro 
blood.”33 As Sharfstein comments, then, “before the one-drop rule’s widespread 
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codification in the 1910s and 1920s, the color line was formally demarcated 
through a patchwork of statutes and common law rules. … These rules were 
based on physical appearance, genealogy, and the performance or possession of 
the privileges of whiteness.”34
In the decades before the Civil War, state laws thus attempted, sporadically, 
to employ a rhetoric in which one drop of black blood made a person black, 
well before its formal systematization in the early twentieth century. What role 
did advertisements for runaway slaves passing as white play in enhancing or 
undermining the ideology of the one-drop rule? Indeed, some of these very 
questions about what whiteness is, what blackness is, and who is “purely white” 
are debated within them. Moreover, especially in the three decades preceding 
the Civil War, there is an anxious attempt in these advertisements to pinpoint 
something like a racial essence—something that makes a person “two-thirds 
white” but not “pure white,” or something that would allow an observer knowl-
edgeable about racial difference to detect the “one drop” of black blood. Yet 
the discourse often contradicts itself by failing to pinpoint the trait that evacu-
ates the enslaved from the category of whiteness. These documents also evince 
knowledge that passers can easily fade into the white population at large once 
free, and so some of the documents subtly manifest fear that the passer him- or 
herself actively threatens the idea of white racial purity. Racial passers put pres-
sure on the notion of the one-drop rule by seeming to challenge the idea that 
black racial ancestry is detectable, visible, or even present after a certain num-
ber of racial intermixtures have occurred. Some of the advertisements indicate 
that there is, in fact, no difference between someone who is white and “nearly 
white,” while others attempt (especially in the decades preceding the Civil War) 
to cling to the ideology that a single ancestor makes an individual black (and 
therefore inferior to whites), even in the face of their ability to pass. Yet ideo-
logical thinking about racial fixity is uneven, so the advertisements cannot al-
ways be categorized neatly from a historical perspective. It is from within the 
gaps and slippages of this ideology that challenges to it emerge.
Debating the Agency of the Pass: Intentional or Not?
Some of these historical controversies about what race signifies are embed-
ded in the question of how intentional the passing of the runaway slave is—and 
to what extent the runaway controls and manipulates his or her production of 
a white racial persona. Passing for white and free when one is considered by 
the law and society to be black and enslaved often involves a complicated per-
formance, as well as an awareness of the physical, linguistic, social, and legal 
protocols that create racialized identity. Looking back on these documents in 
an era that acknowledges that racial identity is (in large part) performative, one 
sees all kinds of agency in these passing dramas. Masters, however, sometimes 
appear more befuddled about to what extent their property is capable of using 
and manipulating the conventions of racial and class identity toward a perfor-
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mance that enables their freedom. Many masters viewed blacks as childlike and 
inferior mentally to whites and so refused to acknowledge the evidence of intel-
ligence, agency, and skill embedded in all kinds of activities of enslaved life.35 
Within the advertisements for slaves who escaped by passing, some masters 
appear to admire the enslaved’s ability to command and control the signifiers of 
racial identity, while other advertisements betray a patent attempt to read a kind 
of accidentalness or lack of intentionality back into these performances, in the 
face of evidence to the contrary.
For example, an advertisement posted in the Virginia Gazette on Septem-
ber 17, 1770, narrates ambiguity about how much control one slave exhibited in 
his manipulation of the codes of race and class: “Run away from the subscriber, 
near Fredericksburg, a light mulatto man (who may easily pass for a white man) 
named Jack, though very probably he may change his name to John Wilkson, 
about 5 feet 6 or 7 inches high, and well made; had on when he went off a brown 
fustian coat, canvas waistcoat, and light coloured cloth breeches.”36 With his 
nice clothing and light skin, Jack (who may change his name to John, perhaps 
to better pass) “may easily pass for a white man,” states the advertisement—but 
does he exactly decide to pass for white (and presumably middle class)? The 
discourse neither confirms nor denies the agency of the pass, even though the 
changing of names is often allied with some sort of passing. Almost the exact 
same language is employed in this same journal thirteen years later to describe 
another slave: “Thirty dollar reward. … Osbourn … white enough to pass for a 
white man.”37 Whether Osbourn controls the agency of the pass remains unclear 
throughout this advertisement.
More than seventy years later, the question of the passer’s control over his 
or her passing performance is still debated in these advertisements. An unusual 
advertisement for a runaway twelve-year-old boy appeared in the Columbus, 
Georgia Tri-Weekly Enquirer on March 14, 1857. “I will pay $25 for the ap-
prehension of a small negro boy named Walter … very bright mulatto, small 
features, gray eyes, has a down look when spoken to, when talking the brogue 
peculiar to South Caroline negroes,” writes the owner, Van Marcus. The boy 
is marked as “negro” linguistically (by his brogue), and the owner has “reason 
to believe that the boy was aided or carried off by some white person.”38 Yet 
the last line of the advertisements complicates this: “The boy will no doubt 
endeavor to pass for a white boy.” If the boy was “carried off by some white 
person” this implies an involuntary escape (perhaps a kidnapping by a white 
abolitionist, a claim made frequently by white masters), yet his owner grants 
him volition over the actions when he says “the boy will no doubt endeavor to 
pass for a white boy.” Category crisis is evident in the advertisement, as the 
owner both does and does not believe that his slave would be intelligent enough 
to escape or pass for white on his own. A fictional parallel might be drawn to 
Charles Chesnutt’s short story, “The Passing of Grandison” (1899), which is 
set in the early 1850s; in this story the central character Grandison claims to 
have been kidnapped (while in the North) by white abolitionists, who take him 
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to Canada and try to free him. However, he claims that he steadily made his 
way back to his master’s plantation, where he is fêted by his master (Colonel 
Owens), who takes at face value his story that he was “carried off.” Just a few 
weeks later, however, Grandison escapes with his entire family—apparently 
having used his time in the North to prepare a route on the Underground Rail-
road to Canada. Owens is fooled by Grandison’s subservient and even Sambo-
like demeanor in the same way that Van Marcus seems to be duped by Walter’s 
brogue and “down cast” look into thinking—or perhaps hoping—that his slave 
was decoyed off by some abolitionist.39 Yet the last line of the advertisement—
that Walter will “no doubt endeavour to pass for a white boy”—betrays aware-
ness that something more exists behind the downcast look and broken English 
of this young boy.
Slave owners also seem puzzled at times about how deliberate a decep-
tion their slaves might have undertaken in escaping and in passing for white. 
This perplexity intersects with a key concern in passing discourse of the past 
and present about whether passing involves some deliberate level of deception 
or can be merely accidental. For example, sociologist Brooke Kroeger defines 
passing as “when people effectively present themselves as other than who they 
understand themselves to be. … Passing involves erasing details or certain 
aspects of a given life,”40 and legal scholar Randall Kennedy offers a similar 
definition: “passing requires that a person be consciously engaged in conceal-
ment.”41 Yet many literary passing narratives from the nineteenth century turn 
on a passer who does not know his or her “true” racial ancestry, and so passes 
for white for many years without conscious knowledge of this passing behav-
ior. Lydia Maria Child’s “The Quadroons” (1840), Hannah Crafts’s The Bond-
woman’s Narrative (ca. 1853–61), William Wells Brown’s Clotel (1853), and 
Frances Harper’s Iola Leroy (1892) feature individuals who do not know for 
some portion of the narrative that they descend from a black mother who was 
herself enslaved and so are (in effect) accidentally passing as white.42
Perhaps most useful, then, in trying to consider the agency of the pass 
and/or the passer’s level of deception is the work of the late sociologist Erv-
ing Goffman, who viewed passing as a range of behaviors such as “unwitting 
passing that the passer never learns he is engaging in,” “unintended passing 
that the surprised passer learns about in mid-passage,” “passing during non-
routine parts of the social round,” passing “during routine daily occasions, such 
as work,” and/or “disappearance”—“complete passing over in all areas of life, 
the secret being known only to the passer himself.”43 Referring this back to 
advertisements for runaway slaves, some masters may have clung to any shred 
of evidence suggesting that these near-white individuals passed only uninten-
tionally, by accident, as it were, instead of granting them control over the racial 
performance and the intelligence often required to enact it.
It is indeed quite striking how often these advertisements use ambiguous 
and conditional language concerning whether the passer is or is not deliberately 
passing for white and is or is not engaged in a purposeful and premeditated 
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deception. The Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser from September 
3, 1782, posts an advertisement for a runaway slave named Jack, “a very white 
mulatto, short and well set, freckled and has gray or blue eyes, short light hair 
curling in one row, thick stubbed nose; his other features are strong, and his 
face rather large for his stature.” After such close attention to physiological and 
physiognomical details, the advertisement then goes on to describe his cloth-
ing, his trade as a weaver and shoemaker, and the items he carried away with 
him, only to conclude enigmatically, “He will pass very well for a white man.”44 
Does he try to pass? And what might this trying to pass entail? Such vague 
language is used throughout the period, across a wide range of geographical 
regions:
South Carolina Gazette, June 25, 1772: Run away the 22d 
Instant, June, a Mulatto young man, named Jack, about 20 
years of age … has light brown hair, and may pass for a white 
man.45
Federal Republican and Commercial Gazette [Baltimore], 
February 24, 1810: Sixty Dollars Reward. … Jack is so light 
a mulatto that he might pass for a white lad, unless particu-
larly noticed.46
Baltimore Patriot and Mercantile Advertiser, April 5, 1828: 
Ran away from the subscriber last Tuesday a very bright Mu-
latto Boy, called Robert. … Bob is very near white, so much 
so that at a little distance he would pass for white.47
Macon Daily Telegraph, June 15, 1860: $20 Reward. I will 
pay the above reward for the apprehension of Martha and 
Celia, who absconded last night. Martha is a Mulatto Woman 
about 30 years old, orange color, straight hair, and walks a 
little lame. Celia, her daughter, is about 11 years old, a bright 
mulatto, can pass for white.48
As already noted, passing for white often entailed manipulation of com-
plicated sets of signifiers involving names, clothing, appearance, speech, and 
other details, so when a master says his slave “might pass,” “may pass,” “would 
pass,” or “can pass” for white, he seems to be understating the sophisticated 
intelligence involved in such a performance.
Some masters also aver that their slaves can pass for white unless they 
are carefully examined; in so doing they once again raise questions about how 
intentional the passing performance is. An advertisement from the Maryland 
Journal and Baltimore Advertiser in 1785 comments that the “remarkable white 
mullato [sic] Slave” James “will pass for a white man without close examina-
tion”49 without going into details; in what ways the “white mullato Slave” is 
“remarkable” also remains enigmatic. As Sollors discusses, a wide variety of 
texts held that there were a few key tell-tale traits to determine a black racial 
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identity in the absence of dark skin, such as dark moons on the fingernails, a 
certain luminosity to the irises or a yellow tinge to the whites of the eyes, or 
hair at the base of the neck or elsewhere that had a certain kink.50 The owner of 
James implies that a person who knows to look closely for such tell-tale mark-
ers might find them in James. But does James conceal racial markers by (for 
example) closely trimming his hair, wearing gloves or eyeglasses, or donning 
a wig? This is left ambiguous. Again and again this language of “close inspec-
tion” is repeated, especially around the area of New Orleans, where interracial 
sexual relations had been so common as to produce a class of enslaved indi-
viduals who looked entirely white:
The Daily Picayune [New Orleans], March 10, 1854: Ran 
away last evening. … Sarah Marshall, a light mulatto girl 
about sixteen years of age, with blue eyes and black hair, and 
might easily pass for white if not closely inspected.51
Daily Picayune [New Orleans], July 7, 1855: Ran away—the 
Negro boy Tom, aged about 22 years. He is a bright mulatto 
and could pass for white, if not closely noticed.52
Masters here attempt to stabilize the idea of whiteness by implying that it 
can be separated from blackness in some way (by “close inspection”), although 
they leave the means of detecting this blackness unwritten.
A discourse in which the passer is not exactly white, and is not exactly 
granted control over the performance of the pass, is therefore common. Several 
advertisements from the period 1830–60 stand out in particular, however, for 
their attempt to adhere rhetorically to an ideology in which the enslaved person, 
no matter how white-looking, is still always black. The first was published in 
Delaware in 1834:
People’s Press [Wilmington], November 12, 1834: $100 
Reward will be given for the apprehension of my Mulatto 
Man Jo. … He is two thirds white, and when cleanly dressed, 
“might pass” for a white man.53
On the one hand, Jo’s master refers to him as “two thirds white.” But on the 
other hand, by putting the phrase “might pass” into quotes and italics, he seems 
to indicate skepticism about how well Jo can indeed truly and successfully pass 
for a white man. A similar degree of linguistic ambiguity appears in the follow-
ing advertisement, published in Memphis in 1860:
Memphis Weekly Appeal, April 18, 1860: $500 REWARD. 
Ranaway from the subscriber, about the 27th February last, a 
certain mulatto boy about 18 years old named DAN. Said boy 
is nearly white, sandy hair, weighs 155 pounds—about five 
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feet eight inches in height, has good teeth, good countenance, 
and would nearly pass for a white person—has black eyes.54
Dan is “nearly white” and can “nearly pass for a white person.” It is very 
difficult to locate or pinpoint the racial difference that marks him as “not white,” 
yet he does not quite slip into the category of whiteness, as Fanny appears to 
do. The logic of racial ideology is troubled here, but not annihilated, as it seems 
these advertisements cling to ideas of racial difference that separate these near-
white individuals from “pure” white ones, and makes their passing performance 
detectable in some way.
Passing for “White”: Intentionality Granted
(But Not Whiteness)
On the other hand, many advertisements indicate quite clearly that the en-
slaved individual intentionally passes for a white man or woman. The earliest 
example of passing’s usage in a racial sense that I have located comes from a 
1747 New York newspaper:
The New-York Weekly Journal, no. 701, May 25, 1747: Made 
his escape from on board the Privateer Brig, Pollux, on the 
20th inst, a Mulatto man named Storde, a Bermudian Born, 
aged about 23 years … pretty fair, with his Head commonly 
shaved in order to make himself pass for a white man, by 
trade a carpenter; the cloathes he used to wear before he left 
the vessel, was a check’d shirt, a striped Flannel Jacket, a pair 
of Oxnabrig trousers, a red and white worsted cap, and some 
other cloathes. … He carried with him both shoes and stock-
ings, with a large pair of silver shoe buckles and a silver stock 
buckle and also a pair of Gold Sleeve Buttons, when in Ber-
muda, which without doubt he had with him, and which, ’tis 
thought he will offer to sell. It is very likely that he may be 
well dress’d as he had good cloath when he left Bermuda.55
The intentionality of the slave to pass racially seems clear; it is said that 
Storde has his head “commonly shaved in order to make himself pass for a 
white man,” perhaps to disguise hair that was too wavy or coarse to be consid-
ered “white.” Indeed, attention to hair as a feature in these advertisements is 
obsessive; when skin does not reveal racial identity, it is clear that hair might 
function as another signifier for decoding or detecting race. The advertisement 
also manifests awareness that not only racial features, but also class-based ones, 
construct a slave’s identity as chattel, as a piece of property rather than a proper-
ty owner; Storde escapes with “both shoes and stockings” and with gold sleeve 
buttons and silver buckles that he will either sell or use to create new clothing. 
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“It is very likely that he may be well dress’d as he had good cloath when he left 
Bermuda,” comments the advertisement. Presumably, Storde left with this cloth 
and with the intention of sewing himself new clothes. Storde is here granted 
enough agency to understand and manipulate codes of class, property owning, 
and prosperity, even as he is reinscribed as chattel, as a piece of black property. 
“Ten pounds” it is said, will reclaim the property, “the said Mullato slave.”
Another early advertisement that grants the enslaved agency over the pass 
was published in 1773. “Run away from Etham, on Sunday the 20th of Jan last, 
a light Mulatto Fellow named OTHO … with a freckled Face, light gray Eyes, 
brown Hair tied behind, his Skin under his clothes very white, had on a blue 
Cloth Coat and Waistcoat with a red Velvet Cape, and I expect will endeavour 
to pass for a white Man” reads an advertisement from the Virginia Gazette on 
February 18, 1773.56 Under his clothes Otho is described as “very white”—per-
haps his master had him out in the fields to darken this whiteness. But Otho will 
uncover this whiteness and “endeavor to pass for a white man”; the linguistic 
focus appears to be on the slave’s effort to pass for white. Prior to the Revo-
lutionary period, as noted, whites were kept in forms of long-term indentured 
servitude, and Otho’s master does not seem concerned about whether his slave 
is or is not white.
Many advertisements written during the time period when the one-drop 
rule was being formalized, however, attempt to imply that runaway slaves who 
intentionally pass are “nearly white” but not “white.” For example, the Charles-
ton Courier from August 4, 1820, lists an advertisement for a runaway named 
Jack Mason (or Jack Jones) who has “sandy, strait hair, and is almost white”; 
the owner comments that “the fellow no doubt will attempt to pass for a white 
man, which by the by is nearly the fact, but not free born.”57 Jack is “nearly” a 
white man and “almost white,” but not “white” and not “free born,” so subject 
to enslavement. A legal status as slave trumps a white appearance, although 
some category crisis appears in the equivocal phrase “which by the by is nearly 
the fact” in regards to Jack’s status as “nearly” a white man. A similar advertise-
ment from Georgia by the planter Zachariah Booth in 1833 reads: 
Stop Mabin!! Runaway from my house in Talbot County, 
Georgia, on Flint River, on 25th of December last at night 
a man slave by the name of Mabin, about twenty years old, 
chunkily built, a bright mulatto, with grey eyes—hair straight 
and sandy—a great deal on his head and rather bushy. He will 
pass for a white man where he is not known.58 
The advertisement implies that where he is “not known” Mabin can pass 
for a white man, but this passing certainly does not make him white—he is still 
coded as “mulatto” by the advertisement.
An advertisement from New York in 1783 grants intentionality through 
the action of pretending to be white, yet also implies that the passer is not truly 
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white: “Run Away … Mulatto, or Quadroon Girl, about 14 years of age, named 
Seth, but calls herself Sall, sometimes says she is white and often paints her 
face to cover that deception.”59 As read by her master, Seth is involved in a 
performance in which she passes for something she is not—she is a “mulatto” 
or “quadroon” girl passing for white. While this advertisement does not grant 
her racial status as “white,” it does instate her agency through this performance 
or “deception.” These advertisements therefore show ideology being constantly 
reinvented, for no matter how “white” these men and women are or pretend to 
be, rhetorical markers are put into place that still mark them as “black” escaped 
slaves.
Passing for Free and White
As discussed above, passing for white and passing for free often are inter-
connected. Especially after the American Revolution, when blacks gradually 
became the only permanently enslaved labor pool, a white appearance could be 
important as a marker of free status. It is no surprise, then, that many advertise-
ments entwine whiteness (light skin or fair complexion) with passing for free:
Virginia Independent Chronicle [Davis], July 9, 1778: Run-
away … a likely mullato woman, called Rachel; about 25 
years of age. … She is an excellent seamstress, and probably 
will pass (from being uncommonly white) for a free woman, 
unless closely observed.60
Annapolis, Maryland Gazette, July 20, 1786: Ran away … a 
mulatto slave named Toney, a very likely, well made, active 
fellow … he will probably attempt to get to Baltimore and 
pass as a free man, from his color.61
Charleston, City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, June 4, 1821: 
Ranaway … two Negroes: the one, a yellow fellow, named 
Randall … The other, his wife, named Ann. … N.B. As the 
above Negroes are of light complexion, they may attempt to 
pass as free.62
Charleston, South Carolina State Gazette, December 20, 
1830: Ranaway. … Sophia … fifteen years old. … a bright 
mulatto, with remarkably straight hair. … From her colour 
and appearance, she may be supposed to be free and no 
doubt will endeavor to pass herself as such.63
It seems, then, that passing for free was often strongly marked as racial 
passing, passing (at least temporarily) out of blackness and servitude and into 
whiteness and freedom. Of course, as Amani Marshall reminds us, “in passing 
for free, runaways relied on more than just their complexions,” but Marshall 
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also notes that “passing for free was easier for fair-skinned slaves who were 
assumed to be white.”64
The nexus between whiteness and freedom suggests that while it was theo-
retically possible to be black and free, grave limits were placed on the freedoms 
allowed to blacks as a class. Free blacks enjoyed only limited legal rights in 
virtually all states; even states that had banned slavery often refused to extend 
to free blacks rights associated with full legal citizenship such as voting, serv-
ing on juries, or testifying in court.65 Moreover, insurrection was a significant 
fear in the early decades of the nineteenth century, because of revolts by Gabriel 
Prosser (1800), Denmark Vesey (1822), and Nat Turner (1831), as well as the 
publication of David Walker’s fiery Appeal (1829). Such events ultimately led 
to a tightening of rules and laws limiting the freedom of movement, gathering, 
literacy, and other activities of blacks in both the North and the South. In such 
a context, the equation between white skin and freedom became more robust; 
even though laws in many states technically allowed for black and free indi-
viduals, the reality was often far different.
Fictional and nonfictional literary texts from this period can also shed light 
on the connections between whiteness and freedom by amplifying the some-
what cryptic discourse of these advertisements. In 1848, Ellen Craft passed for 
white and male to escape from slavery; her darker-skinned husband, William, 
escaped with her by passing as her slave.66 The implication of their narrative is 
that Ellen Craft’s performance of whiteness is the key to freedom for both indi-
viduals, while her performance of masculinity is only to insure her safety while 
traveling. Yet it also needs to be noted that William Craft—too dark-skinned to 
pass for white—successfully passed as her slave to enable the couple’s travel 
to the North.
Passing for white and free are also intertwined in one of the earliest novels 
to use the passing trope—Richard Hildreth’s The Slave; or, Memoirs of Archy 
Moore (1836). Here the protagonist, a “white negro,” successfully escapes from 
slavery by passing as a free man both racially and in terms of his class status; 
that is, he looks white but also possesses some of the necessary attributes that 
code him as white and propertied, such as “good clothes, and as much learn-
ing as an overseer.” One of Archy’s fellow slaves—Thomas—is darker-skinned 
and so explicitly refuses to run away with Archy: “You can readily pass for a 
free man. … If I go with you, we shall both be stopped and questioned. … We 
shall certainly be taken.” Thomas’s logic foreshadows cases such as Dred Scott 
v. Sandford (1857) when he argues, “It is a great way to the free states, and I 
have little chance and no hope of ever getting there; and if I did, what should I 
gain by it? … But you, Archy, you can do better.”67 Juridically free blacks were 
often treated as inferior, noncitizens with few legal rights, so freedom means 
little to Thomas and he opts to become an outlaw instead.
Although not a case about passing per se, Dred Scott v. Sandford casts 
light on the connection between whiteness and various types of social and legal 
privilege in the years leading up to the Civil War evident in both advertisements 
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for runaway slaves and literary texts. In 1846 Dred Scott sued for his freedom 
on the grounds that although he and his wife Harriet were slaves, they were 
entitled to their liberty because they resided in Illinois and the Wisconsin Terri-
tory, geographical areas in which slavery was illegal. In 1857 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled against Scott, finding that neither he, nor any person of 
African ancestry, could claim citizenship in the United States. What is most 
salient for a discussion of passing is the idea that the presiding judge—Taney—
puts forward about an absolute and perpetual black legal and social inferiority; 
black Americans are ruled to be “a subordinate [60 U.S. 393, 405] and inferior 
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights 
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might 
choose to grant them.”68 Whether free or enslaved, a line is drawn by this deci-
sion between blacks (an inferior, oppressed, noncitizen race) and whites. This 
means, then, that for the racial passer, claiming a form of whiteness was vital to 
a successful escape as well as (possibly) to continued freedom once he or she 
had reached safe territory.
Passing as Native American or White Nationalities
The meaning of whiteness itself, however, was not always clear, and some 
slaves escaped by exploiting connections to Native American ancestry (con-
sidered in many states to be free) or by passing as a European national. Before 
looking at these specific advertisements, however, it is useful to consider one 
court case that might amplify the meaning of these brief documents. An impor-
tant legal explication of this behavior can be found in Hudgins v. Wright (1806), 
where a status as Native American led to freedom for a group of enslaved wom-
en. According to Ariela Gross, this case was one of the most influential trials in 
setting a Southern precedent for slave/free status on the basis of race.69 Haney 
López concurs, arguing, “Hudgins tells us one is Black if one has a single Af-
rican antecedent, or if one has a ‘flat nose’ or a ‘wooly head of hair.’”70 As he 
goes on to explain, under southern law in most states, “Blacks were presumably 
slaves and thus bore the burden of proving a free ancestor; Whites and Indians 
were presumably free and thus the burden of proving their descent fell on those 
alleging slave status.”71
In advertisements for black runaway slaves, there are many examples of 
exploiting a connection to a Native American ancestry or to nationalities con-
sidered to be “white.” “RAN away from the Subscriber … his Mulatto Waiting 
Man, named Jem, about 28 or 30 years of Age,” reads an advertisement from 
the Annapolis Maryland Gazette on October 20, 1763. The advertisement goes 
on to describe in detail an individual who knows how to pass for Indian, for 
several tradespersons, and for free:
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A well-set Fellow, wears his own black Hair, which is com-
monly tied in a Cue behind, or platted, and curls on each Side 
of his Face. Had on when he went away, a Cotton Jacket, 
Brown Roll Trousers, and old Shoes; but, it is supposed, he 
will change both his Name and Dress, as he has been seen 
with his Hair comb’d out straight, and an Indian Match coat 
on: I am informed he intends to make his Escape in that Dis-
guise, pass for an Indian, and profess himself a Shoe maker. 
He is well acquainted both in Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
and is a very handy, sly, complaisant, smooth tongued Fel-
low, can shave and dress a Wig as well as most Barbers, and 
will (as he is a light Mulatto) probably pass for a Freeman, 
and profess himself of that Trade.72
The discourse that seeks to re-enslave Jem as a piece of property also rein-
forces his resourcefulness, intelligence, and knowledge. It seems that Jem could 
pass as Indian by braiding his hair, as a freeman by changing his clothes, and as 
either a barber or shoemaker by brandishing the various tools of these trades.73 
If this individual dresses and looks like an Indian, implies the owner Wagga-
man, he may be able to blend in with the “Back Indians,” a tribe of Indians in 
Maryland known as the Susquehannock.
Passing for white is also sometimes conjoined with passing for Native 
American. Peter Youngblood ran away from his owner Captain Easterby and 
was advertised in the Charleston Courier on April 7, 1831. “Peter [has] … very 
light complexion, straight black hair, rather slim and pale,” says the advertise-
ment. He can also manipulate the codes of race and class: “When well dressed 
looks very genteel, but might be taken for an Indian, or might pass either for 
a free or white person, as he can invent quite plausible stories of himself.” 
Finally, he will certainly portray himself as a tradesperson of some sort: “Said 
Peter Youngblood is very ingenious, and has been in my employ as a dyer and 
scourer; he has a great liking for tailoring, and knows something of it.”74 What 
comes through in the advertisement is the sense of a resourceful, intelligent, 
capable person who can “invent quite plausible stories of himself”—stories that 
generate multiple, and mutating, identities as a free person, a white person, a 
Native American, a tailor, and a cloth maker.75
One final example in which a slave passes for free, upper class, French, and 
white illustrates, again, the level of control over the passing performance that 
is sometimes embedded in these documents. In May of 1794, a “mulatto” slave 
named Joe Cully ran away from his master, who then advertised him in detail in 
the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser. Offering a twenty dollar re-
ward for this “very bright and much freckled … very genteel made, spry, active 
fellow,” Joe Cully’s owner comments that Joe escaped with “three white shirts, 
one brown ditto, a pair of satinet breeches dyed purple, a pair of country jeans 
ditto, dyed nankeen colour, [and] one swanskin waistcoat, striped.”76 Escaping 
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with clothing that could mark him as an upper-class gentleman, Cully demon-
strates a sophisticated awareness that not only his race, but also his class, could 
subject him to enslavement. Finally, Cully’s owner notes that he “endeavours 
to pass as a Frenchman, and alters his tongue to a broken language that may 
be very perceivable to anyone that should converse with him.” With his vari-
ous sets of apparel, his light skin and freckles, his multilingual abilities, and 
his genteel persona, Joe Cully can pass for a free, white, upper-class, French 
gentleman, not the impoverished black slave that he in fact is, or so the adver-
tisement implies. In this advertisement, the master seems to be in some degree 
of category crisis, as whiteness is shown to be more performative than real—a 
matter of clothing, speech, and activities. Furthermore, by the very detail in 
which Joe Cully is carefully described, the owner appears to validate him as 
a skillful, intelligent subject. At the same time, the advertisement seeks to re-
enslave Cully specifically as an item of property, an escaped slave inferior to, 
and lacking coequal status with, white men.
Passing as White and Married: Families Passing for
White to Escape Together
Marriage occurred under slavery but had no legal sanction, and in most 
states (with the exception of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts) miscegenation 
was banned at least until the Civil War; indeed, as late as 1969, marriages be-
tween whites and blacks were outlawed in some states.77 Prior to the Civil War, 
a marital state therefore sometimes became interlinked with a status as free and 
(sometimes) white. In some cases one partner was in fact technically free (and 
white) while the other was enslaved and black, as this advertisement illustrates:
Virginia Gazette, March 17, 1774: Run away from the sub-
scriber, in Cumberland county, on the 26th of February a 
Mulatto man slave named SANCHO, appears to be about 40 
years old, stoops a good deal, and is by trade a carpenter and 
cooper. … Absconded with him a white servant woman. … I 
expect they will change their names and endeavor to pass for 
husband and wife, as free people.78
The structure of the advertisement implies that the whiteness (of the “ser-
vant woman”) allows marriage, which then allows freedom. Moreover, it seems 
that Sancho, too, would be passing for white, because an interracial married 
couple traveling through Virginia in 1774 would arouse great suspicion. Simi-
larly, in the Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser from February 6, 1781, 
Barbara Williams offers an incredible amount of money—a “Four Thousand 
Dollars Reward”—for her “white Mulatto slave, named Leonard” who was 
“persuaded off by a white woman, who calls herself Rachel Dorsey.” Williams 
goes on to state that “it appears that she had two children by the above slave” 
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and that “it is supposed they will pass for man and wife, and make for Penn-
sylvania or the Eastern Shore.”79 Although the advertisement does not say this, 
again, it seems the “white mulatto slave” Leonard will also pass for a white 
man, at least until he reaches Pennsylvania, where mixed-race marriage was 
allowed.
Like William and Ellen Craft, enslaved black couples sometimes escaped 
together. In one striking 1826 example, a married couple used passing for white 
to obtain freedom; an enslaved woman named Linda, whose owner believes 
that she “might be taken by a stranger for a white woman, and may attempt to 
pass as free” describes how she escapes with her darker husband, Tom. Appar-
ently Linda enlists a British man to pose as her husband, and Tom travels with 
them as their servant.80 In Georgia in 1855, another couple ran away together 
and passed off the darker member of the duo as “property”: 
Ranaway from the subscriber on the 20th inst. A yellow boy 
named Rufus. … Also a mulatto woman named Margaret 
Green. She was well dressed, had on a bundle of fine cloth-
ing, and I believe she is now making her way to Columbus, 
and will no doubt pass for white, having but one-eighth negro 
blood in her, she having decoyed the boy off will, in all prob-
ability, pass him off as her property.81 
Both Margaret and Rufus are granted a high degree of perspicacity in the 
advertisement; Rufus is “a fine and intelligent boy,” and Margaret is clever 
enough to utilize her nice clothing to pass as an upper-class woman traveling 
with her “property.” Yet she herself is “property.” The advertisement also mani-
fests uncertainty about Rufus’s alliances. It says that Margaret has “decoyed 
the boy off,” which appears to remove his agency, but being “passed off” as 
someone else’s “property” certainly indicates a degree of complicity in this plan 
on Rufus’s part.
Individuals who could pass for white also sometimes helped their siblings 
who could not, at times exercising extraordinary skill in doing so. One fascinat-
ing pair passing was published in the Charleston Courier on July 30, 1849, and 
is worth quoting in detail:
Fifty dollars reward—Runaway from Savannah, on the 6th 
July, 1849, my Mulatto man Patrick; his color is very bright, 
straight hair, color of deep red, 5 feet 8 or 9 inches, age 24 
or 25 years, slim build, cooper by trade. He left in company 
with his brother, who goes by the name Adam Mendenhall, 
a barber by trade. Adam is a darker Mulatto than Patrick; 
round shouldered, hair black and inclined a little to curl. He 
is 45 years of age, and may, from his trade being a barber, en-
deavor to alter their hair by coloring or wearing a wig. They 
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may endeavor to pass for white or free person, as Adam is a 
very intelligent negro, and can read and write. Patrick can do 
neither. … The above named boys went off in a wagon, as 
pedlars; Adam is also a runaway, and Patrick is acting as his 
waiting man.82
Beyond their ability to “pass for white or free persons,” the advertisement 
also notes how they will (perhaps) dye their hair and wear wigs; Adam may 
also pass as a peddler, and Patrick may pass as his apprentice or manservant. 
Adam can read and write and is also described as “very intelligent.” Whiteness 
is explicitly shown to be something that can be performed by clothing, literacy, 
wigs, trades, and (perhaps) the careful use of some face powder. The advertise-
ment as a whole seems to indicate that the owner’s conception of what makes 
a white man different from these two intelligent, resourceful, near-white indi-
viduals may be in crisis. Moreover, these men resist the way their bodies would 
be surveilled and demarcated in print forms such as newspapers. “Resistance,” 
comment Gwenda Morgan and Peter Ruston, “is produced through the deliber-
ate control of visibility”; “power demanded visibility, but this was not always 
forthcoming.”83 These two men engage in a range of behaviors that frustrate the 
public’s ability to see and know their visible bodies as black or enslaved. They 
formulate a series of metamorphosing identities that stand in opposition to a 
monolithic status as black, enslaved property.
Conclusion: Advertisements for
Runaway Slaves as Counter-Hegemonic
What inferences can be drawn from this data? First, while these adver-
tisements demarcate questions about the meaning, validity, and construction 
of whiteness and blackness, as well other ethnic identities, they also articulate 
questions about whether categories of racial identity are “real” and defining 
of an individual in some way, or, conversely, masks and roles that can be per-
formed (or not), as the individual desires. The documents also complicate uni-
tary notions of racial identity, and therefore the idea that being “true” to one’s 
“real” racial identity is unproblematic; both the owner of the slave (through the 
discourse of the advertisements) and the passing subject (through his or her 
behavior) at times delineate the multiplicity and instability of racial identity 
and allegiance. Questions of whether the racial passer denies his or her (one) 
“true race” by passing for white and whether passing troubles a black-white ra-
cial binary are still present in contemporary debates about the behavior.84 How-
ever, it is uncertain whether these individuals who passed for white or Native 
American or French truly believed themselves to be white or Native American 
or French. While it is clear that many deliberately changed or occluded racial 
and class signifiers that marked them as black and enslaved, in so doing they 
might have been simply expressing their sense of selfhood. In The Woman Who 
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Pretended to Be Who She Was: Myths of Self-Imitation (2005), Wendy Doniger 
discusses the ways individuals in the past and present perform roles that they 
truly become or even initially perceive themselves to be, in the face of a society 
that labels them otherwise.85 So might it be with the racial passer, who runs 
away from slavery by inhabiting a “false” self and racial identity, or perhaps 
by only pretending to be what he or she “really” believes himself or herself to 
be. In playing up multiple sides of their identities, these individuals may come 
to possess more fully their own lived, perceived, or implicit sense of selfhood.
Second, whiteness, in particular, seems to be in category crisis in these 
documents. In these advertisements, masters struggle (and often fail) to define 
their slaves who can pass for white as white-looking but not-quite-white. Run-
away slave advertisements reveal, as Waldstreicher notes, the ways in which 
slaves capitalized on the expectations of the masters by contravening their ex-
pected social positions, and the ways the masters struggle to replace the slaves 
in expected roles.86 This applies to the enslaved individual’s whiteness as well, 
however. Masters qualify, recast, and rescind the notion that their slaves are 
almost white or white to force passing escaped slaves back into the paradigm 
of the nonwhite, from which they appear to have absconded. Yet at times racial 
ideology itself seems to be ruptured in these advertisements to the point where 
it is difficult to repair it as a fulcrum for enslavement. The owner of Fanny, for 
example, appears to be wondering what whiteness really is (if Fanny is “as 
white as most white women”), and the owner of Joe Cully seems to be question-
ing what does indeed make a white, free, upper-class man. The owner of Jack 
Mason admits that it is “nearly the fact” that his slave is “a white man” and can 
only recast him as enslaved based on a legal status as “not free born.” Billy G. 
Smith’s work argues that runaway slaves in the mid-Atlantic created a destabi-
lizing situation and that their actions are comparable to slaves who revolted in 
the South and the Caribbean. Individualistic acts of running away ultimately put 
massive pressure on the system of slavery.87 This pressure also can be heard in 
advertisements that describe various kinds of racial passing, where whiteness 
itself seems to be under assault and even erasure in the face of escaped slaves 
condemned to perpetual enslavement who are, nonetheless, as white as any 
white woman or man who is free.
Finally, while this discourse certainly has a hegemonic origin, in that it 
is an attempt by white slave owners to “out” a slave who can pass for white, 
it also sometimes speaks in a counter-hegemonic way, enunciating a detailed 
portrait of an individual who is explicitly not a bestial black object, or a thing, 
but a fully humanized subject. It becomes very clear in these documents that the 
enslaved “property” has multiple and diverse skills that allow him or her to ex-
press various incarnations of selfhood as upper class, propertied, white, Indian, 
married, and free, as well as various tradespeople or nationalities. In fact, the 
“property,” the possessed, appears at times to be no different, either physically 
or mentally, from the owners. Advertisements for runaway slaves that have as 
their goal re-enslavement of a debased other therefore sometimes grant these 
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very others’ subjectivity, depicting them as rational and intelligent human be-
ings who can perceptively manipulate the legible and illegible protocols that 
create racial, class-based, and social identities. If race is an ideology that must 
be continually recreated, this very process is also at work in the advertisements 
themselves, which anxiously attempt to shore up racial difference, even in the 
face of an evident failure to demarcate individuals along clear-cut and unchang-
ing racial lines.
Notes
1. In deference to usage during this period, throughout this essay I employ the term “black” 
(rather than the more modern term “African American”) to designate individuals of African descent 
residing within the colonies or the United States.
2. Parish Transcripts, Box II, bundle: S.C., Minutes of House of Burgesses (1730–35), 9, 
discussed in Winthrop Jordon, “American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulattoes in 
the British Colonies,” William and Mary Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1962): 189.
3. Henry Laurens to William Drayton, February 15, 1783; see David Duncan Wallace, The 
Life of Henry Laurens (New York: Putnam, 1915), 454.
4. Winthrop Jordan believes both Gideon Gibsons were passing (“American Chiaroscuro” 
191), while Daniel Sharfstein believes that neither Gibson passed for white (see The Invisible Line: 
Three American Families and the Secret Journey from Black to White [New York: Penguin, 2011], 
2–26). However, it seems clear from the language used by contemporaries that the Gibsons were 
viewed as passing into whiteness: “The children of this same Gideon having passed through an-
other state of Whitewash were of fairer complexions than his prosecutor George Gabriel [Powell]” 
(Wallace, Life of Henry Laurens, 454), writes Laurens, a slave owner himself. 
5. Letter to Louis Kossuth, Concerning Freedom and Slavery in the United States (Boston: 
R. F. Walcutt, 1852), 12.
6. Mark Twain, The Tragedy of Pudd’nhead Wilson: And the Comedy of Those Extraordi-
nary Twins (Hartford, CT: American Publishing Company, 1894), 33.
7. According to Werner Sollors, Nathan Huggins coined the phrase “Passing is Passé” as the 
title of an essay written in the early 1970s in his book Revelations: American History, American 
Myths; see Neither Black nor White yet Both: Thematic Explorations of Interracial Literature (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 508. However, the phrase has also been used more recently 
in Paul Spickard’s Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century America 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). For studies that view passing as primarily occur-
ring from 1850 to 1940, see Steven Belluscio, To Be Suddenly White: Literary Realism and Racial 
Passing (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006); Juda Bennett, The Passing Figure: Racial 
Confusion in Modern American Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Gayle Wald, Crossing 
the Line: Racial Passing in Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and Culture (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2000); and Teresa Zackodnik, The Mulatta and the Politics of Race (Jackson: 
University of Mississippi Press, 2004).
8. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the 
Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 73.
9. Ian F. Haney López, “The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice,” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 29, no. 1 (1994): 7.
10. My archive was created from the following print sources and websites: Graham R. Hodg-
es and Alan E. Brown, eds., “Pretends to Be Free”: Runaway Slave Advertisements from Colonial 
and Revolutionary New York and New Jersey (New York: Garland, 1994); Billy G. Smith and 
Richard Wojtowicz, comps., Blacks Who Stole Themselves: Advertisements for Runaways in the 
Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728–1790 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); Lathan 
A. Windley, comp., Runaway Slave Advertisements: A Documentary History from the 1730s to 
1790, 4 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983); Thomas Costa, comp., The Geography of Slav-
ery in Virginia, http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/gos; Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers In-
cluding Early American Newspapers Series 1–6, 1690–1922 and Hispanic American Newspapers, 
1808–1980, http://infoweb.newsbank.com; and UNC Digital Collections, North Carolina Runaway 
Slave Advertisements, 1751–1840, http://libcdm1.uncg.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/RAS.
11. For discussion of some of the different valences of “passing for” versus “passing as,” see 
P. Gabrielle Foreman, “Who’s Your Mama? ‘White’ Mulatta Genealogies, Early Photography, and 
Anti-Passing Narratives of Slavery and Freedom,” American Literary History 14, no. 3 (2002): 
505–39. Because of space constraints, I do not discuss this topic here.
“As White as Most White Women”  95
12. David Waldstreicher, “Reading the Runaways: Self-Fashioning, Print Culture, and Con-
fidence in Slavery in the Eighteenth-Century Mid-Atlantic,” William and Mary Quarterly 56, no. 2 
(1999): 243.
13. Barbara Jean Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology in the Unites States of America,” New 
Left Review 1, no. 181 (1990): 110, 112.
14. See, in particular, Amani Marshall, “‘They Will Endeavor to Pass for Free’: Enslaved 
Runaways’ Performances of Freedom in Antebellum South Carolina,” Slavery & Abolition 31, no. 
2 (2010): 161–80, who examines passing for free in these advertisements. Also see Waldstreicher, 
who focuses on “the acts of cultural hybridization black and racially mixed people committed for 
their own purposes” that can be seen in these advertisements by looking at clothing, trades, linguis-
tic ability, and ethnic or racial identity (247–48).
15. Neither Black nor White yet Both, 248.
16. See Agnes Smedley, Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview (Boul-
der: Westview, 1993), 26–27. As Smedley remarks, “As it evolved in the nineteenth century, race 
posed a new dimension of social differentiation that superseded ‘class.’ Race offered a new mecha-
nism for structuring society based on a conception of naturally fixed, heritable, and immutable 
status categories linked initially to visible physical markers” (27). 
17. I am not, of course, arguing here that all slave masters believed in an essential racial 
difference that justified enslavement. Yet many did. For example, Thomas Jefferson, himself the 
father of black children, writes in 1787 that slavery was warranted because blacks “are inferior to 
the whites in endowments both of body and mind”; see Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William 
Peden (1787; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), 143. Jefferson’s ideas were 
extremely influential and were used by numerous Southern leaders to justify slavery.
18. Smedley, Race in North America, 119.
19. I borrow here Marjorie Garber’s construct of category crisis: “By ‘category crisis’ I mean 
a failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable, that permits of border 
crossings from one (apparently distinct) category to another.” Binary categories are sometimes put 
in question or under erasure by such definitional failure; see Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and 
Cultural Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 1992), 16–17.
20. Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology,” 104, 116.
21. Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
22. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1975).
23. Smedley, Race in North America, 96.
24. For more on the history of white servitude in the colonies, see Don Jordan and Michael 
Walsh, White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain’s White Slaves in America (New York: New 
York University Press, 2008). They argue that in the seventeenth and eighteenth century a huge 
number of white people were shipped to the colonies for enslavement against their will: convicts, 
poor or orphaned children (“urchins”), prostitutes, debtors, Irish Catholics, and others; there was 
also a history of at least 300,000 white voluntary indentured servants being kept in servitude, many 
for their entire lives (12–16). These practices mainly ceased, they argue, by 1820 (280–81).
25. Daniel J. Sharfstein, “Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 
1600–1860,” Minnesota Law Review 19, no. 3 (2007): 597.
26. See, for example, Ingrid Dineen-Wimberly and Paul Spickard, who use this definition in 
“‘It’s not that simple’: Multiraciality, Models, and Social Hierarchy,” in Multiracial Americans and 
Social Class: The Influence of Social Class on Racial Identity, ed. Kathleen Odell Korgen (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 205.
27. For a discussion of these cases, see Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of 
Race on Trial in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
28. On the topic of the movement toward the one-drop rule in the decades preceding the Civil 
War, also see Robert Westley, “First-Time Encounters: ‘Passing’ Revisited and Demystification as a 
Critical Practice,” Yale Law and Policy Review 18, no. 2 (2000): 313; Joel Williamson, New People: 
Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States (1980; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1995): 98; and George M. Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on 
Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914 (1971; Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 
1987), 43–49.
29. Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1843); www.lexisnexis.com.
30. Joshua D. Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood: Sex and Families across the Color 
Line in Virginia, 1787–1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 209.
31. “Louisiana Legislature,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans), February 2, 1857: 7; Readex, 
America’s Historical Newspapers.
32. Sharfstein, “Crossing the Color Line,” 631.
33. Journal of the Indiana State Senate, 43rd Session, 1863 (Indianapolis: Joseph Bingham, 
1863), 308; Internet Archive, https://archive.org/details/journalofindiana1863indi.
34. Sharfstein, “Crossing the Color Line,” 604.
96  Martha J. Cutter
35. Throughout the early nineteenth century, blacks were viewed by many as inherently 
childlike and lower than whites in the so-called great chain of being. For more on how the idea of 
a childlike black race subtended the notion of white American democracy, see Caroline Levander, 
Cradle of Liberty: Race, the Child, and National Belonging from Thomas Jefferson to W. E. B. Du 
Bois (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
36. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 1, 306; emphasis added.
37. Virginia Gazette, January 25, 1783; Costa, Geography of Slavery.
38. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers.
39. Charles Chesnutt, “The Passing of Grandison,” in Charles W. Chesnutt: Selected Writ-
ings, ed. Sally Ann Ferguson (1899; Boston: Houghton, 2001), 268–82. For more on this story’s 
manipulation of the codes of race, see Martha J. Cutter, “Passing as Narrative and Textual Strategy 
in Charles Chesnutt’s ‘The Passing of Grandison,’” in Passing in the Works of Charles W. Chesnutt, 
ed. Susan Prothro Wright and Ernestine Pickens Glass (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
2010): 39–50. Grandison does not pass for white, however.
40. Brooke Kroeger, Passing: When People Can’t Be Who They Are (New York: Public Af-
fairs, 2003), 7–8.
41. Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption (New 
York: Vintage, 2004), 285.
42. See Lydia Maria Child, “The Quadroons,” Liberty Bell (Boston: Anti-Slavery Fair, 1842): 
115–41, Glynis Carr, ed., Online Archive of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Women’s Writings, http://
www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/gcarr/19cUSWW/; Hannah Crafts [Hannah Bond], The Bondwoman’s 
Narrative, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Warner, 2002); William Wells Brown, Clotel; Or, 
the President’s Daughter (London: Partridge and Oakey, 1853), Documenting the American South, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/; and Frances Harper, Iola Leroy: Or Shadows Uplifted (1892; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). Such a phenomenon of ignorance about possible passing due to 
being kept in the dark about racial ancestry is also apparent in recent memoirs such as Gregory Wil-
liams’s Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black (New 
York: Plume, 1995) and Bliss Boyard’s One Drop: My Father’s Hidden Life—A Story of Race and 
Family Secrets (New York: Back Bay, 2008).
43. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Ar-
onson, 1974), 79.
44. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 2, 271.
45. Ibid., vol. 3, 28.
46. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Windley, Runaway Slaves Advertisements, vol. 2, 338.
50. Sollors, Neither Black nor White yet Both, 142–61.
51. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.; emphasis in original text.
54. Naomi Van Tol, Runaway Slave Blog, Memphis and Shelby County Public Library, http://
www.spiny.com/runaway/; emphasis added.
55. Hodges and Brown, “Pretends to Be Free,” 21–22; emphasis added.
56. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 1, 320; emphasis added.
57. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers; emphasis added.
58. Columbus Inquirer, February 9, 1833. See William G. Proctor, “Slavery in Southwest 
Georgia,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 49, no. 1 (1965): 6.
59. The Royal Gazette [New York], no. 675, March 15, 1783; emphasis added. From Hodges 
and Brown, “Pretends to Be Free,” 282.
60. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 1, 396–97; emphasis added.
61. Ibid., vol. 2, 161; emphasis added.
62. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers; emphasis added.
63. Ibid.; emphasis added.
64. Marshall, “‘They Will Endeavor to Pass for Free,’” 168, 173.
65. See James Oliver Horton, “Weevils in the Wheat: Free Blacks and the Constitution, 
1787–1860,” This Constitution 8 (fall 1985): 4–11 and Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell, 48–72.
66. The very light-skinned Ellen Craft cut her hair, wore fashionable male clothing, and 
passed for a rich Southern gentleman. See William Craft, Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom; 
or, the Escape of William and Ellen Craft from Slavery (1860; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1986).
67. Richard Hildreth, The Slave; or, Memoirs of Archy Moore, 2 vols. (Boston: Eastburn, 
1836), vol. 2, 136.
68. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 (19 How.) U.S. 393 (1856), Justia: US Supreme Court, https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/60/393/.
“As White as Most White Women”  97
69. Ariela Gross, “Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South,” Yale Law Journal 108, no. 1 (1998): 129.
70. Haney López, “The Social Construction of Race,” 4–5; emphasis added.
71. Ibid., 2.
72. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 2, 51; emphasis added.
73. For another advertisement in which an individual passes for Native American, see the 
Maryland Gazette from May 21, 1752, which describes a “tall thin Mulatto slave” who ran away 
from his owner; he “looks very much like an Indian, and will endeavor to pass for such when it suits 
him.” Ibid., vol. 2, 16.
74. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers; emphasis added.
75. See also Smith and Wojtowiz, Blacks Who Stole Themselves: “Run away in July last, 
from Nicholas Everson … a mulatto Negroe … his said master has been informed that he intends to 
cut his watch coat, to get Indian stockings, and to cut off his hair, and get a blanket, to pass for an 
Indian” (34).
76. Costa, Geography of Slavery.
77. Statutes against mixed marriages were not formally outlawed in the United States until 
Loving v. State of Virginia (1969). 
78. Windley, Runaway Slave Advertisements, vol. 1, 325; emphasis added.
79. Ibid., vol. 2, 245; emphasis added.
80. Columbia Telescope, August 8, 1826; see Marshall, “‘They Will Endeavor to Pass for 
Free,’” 173.
81. Readex, America’s Historical Newspapers.
82. Ibid.; emphasis added.
83. Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, “Visible Bodies: Power, Subordination and Identity 
in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World,” Journal of Social History 39, no. 1 (2005): 40, 55.
84. See, for example, Brooke Kroeger’s misleadingly titled study Passing: When People 
Can’t Be Who They Are (2003) or Clyde Pulley’s Blacks Who Pass for Indian and White (Chicago: 
Adams, 1978). The idea that the passer “denies” his or her (one) “true” race has once again been 
reinvented in a different time period, for different purposes.
85. Wendy Doniger, The Woman Who Pretended to Be Who She Was: Myths of Self-Imitation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
86. Waldstreicher, “Reading the Runaways,” 248.
87. Billy G. Smith, “Runaway Slaves in the Mid-Atlantic Region during the Revolutionary 
Era,” in The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social 
Movement, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
1995), 199–230. See also John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger, Runaway Slaves: Rebels on 
the Plantation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
